Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences. by Topuzu, Mihaela & Martins-da-Rocha, Victor-Filipe
COURNOT–NASH EQUILIBRIA IN CONTINUUM GAMES WITH
NON-ORDERED PREFERENCES
V.F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND M. TOPUZU
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1. Introduction
In recent years attempts were made to extend the seminal equilibrium existence results
of Gale–Mas-Colell [12] and Shafer–Sonnenschein [24], formulated for abstract games and
economies with a ﬁnite set of players, to the framework of continuum economies and
games with a measure space of agents. It is proved in Balder [5] that the usual conditions
used in the literature for these attempts force the preferred to multifunction to be empty-
valued almost everywhere on the nonatomic part of the measure space, rendering several
published extensions pointless. Yet, at the same time, existence results are well-known to
hold in continuum games, but only by means of proofs that thoroughly exploit the payoﬀ
function structure and its standard-type conditions.
We assert that the modeling of non-ordered preferences provided in Balder [5], Balder–
Yannelis [8], Khan–Papageorgiou [14, 13], Khan–Vohra [15], Kim–Prikry–Yannelis [16],
Noguchi [19, 20] and Yannelis [25, 26] is not relevant to continuum games with externali-
ties. We propose a new modeling of preferences (see Remark 2.1) that encompasses both
the modeling of ordered preferences with externalities of Balder [4, 7] and the modeling
of non-ordered preferences but without externalities of Schmeidler [22], Cornet–Topuzu–
Yildiz [10] and Martins-da-Rocha [17, 18]. Moreover our modeling of non-ordered prefer-
ences does not suﬀer from the serious inconsistency pointed out in Balder [5].
The main result of the paper is the existence of pure Cournot–Nash equilibrium for
continuum games with possibly non-ordered preferences. In the framework of ordered
preferences (i.e. each agent has a utility/payoﬀ function), the existence of pure Cournot–
Nash equilibrium is proved in Balder [4, 7] as a corollary of an existence result of mixed
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Cournot–Nash equilibrium by means of Young measure theory. We propose in this paper
two independent proofs for our existence result. First (see Section 4.1) we prove that
the existence result for games with non-ordered preferences is a simple corollary of the
well-known existence result for games with ordered preferences. From a game with non-
ordered preferences, we deﬁne an auxiliary game with payoﬀ functions such that the set of
optimal actions for both games coincide. It is then suﬃcient to apply the existence results
in Balder [4, 7]. We also provide (see Section 4.2) a second and independent proof only
by means of pure action proﬁles. This proof involves the feeble topology introduced by
Balder [4].
The paper is organized as follows. The model and the main existence result (Theo-
rem 2.1) are presented in Section 2. In Section 3 we provide assumptions on the primi-
tives of the game in order to apply Theorem 2.1. The last section is devoted to the two
independent proofs of the main result. For precise deﬁnitions of the diﬀerent continuity
concepts for multifunctions used in the paper, we refer to Appendix A.
2. The model and the main result
Let (T,T ,µ) be an abstract ﬁnite measure space. The set T is the set of players, which
may be a ﬁnite set or a continuum such as the unit interval or a mixture of both. For
technical reasons we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1. The measure space (T,T ,µ) is complete and separable.
Let S be Hausdorﬀ locally convex topological vector space that is a Suslin space, i.e.
S is the continuous image of a Polish space. The space S is the action space. Examples
of such spaces include separable Banach spaces, equipped with their norm or weak topol-
ogy, duals of separable Banach spaces, equipped with their weak star topology, separable
Fr´ echet spaces, such as C(R), equipped with the compact-open topology, or the space of
all bounded, signed measures on a completely regular Suslin space. We denote by S∗ the
topological dual of S. For each t in T, let St ⊂ S denote the action set of player t. We
denote by Σ the multifunction from T into S deﬁned by Σ(t) := St.
We let T in T be some ﬁxed measurable subset of players that contains the purely atomic
part of (T,T ,µ). The set T is the set of players that will satisfy additional convexity
assumptions. We let b T denote the set T \T and we let T (resp. b T ) be the trace σ-algebra
of T on T (resp. b T). We suppose that the following holds.
Assumption 2.2. For every t ∈ T, the set St is non-empty and compact, and the graph
D := {(t,s) ∈ T × S : s ∈ St}
of the multifunction Σ belongs to T ⊗ B(S). Moreover, for every t ∈ T, the set St is
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We let D be the trace σ-algebra of T ⊗ B(S) on D.
An action proﬁle is a function f : T → S that is measurable with respect to T and
B(S) or, equivalently that is scalarly measurable, i.e. for all s∗ ∈ S∗, the scalar functions
t 7→ hf(t),s∗i is T -measurable. Let S denote the set of all action proﬁles. An action proﬁle
f is feasible if f(t) belongs to St for a.e. t ∈ T. The set of all feasible action proﬁles is
denoted by SΣ. Also, let SΣ be the set of all restrictions to T of functions in SΣ; it is only
this set that needs to be topologized. We endow SΣ with the feeble topology introduced
by Balder (see [4, 7]). The feeble topology on SΣ is deﬁned as the coarsest topology for
which all functionals
Jg : f 7→
Z
T
g(t,f(t))µ(dt), g ∈ GLC,Σ
are continuous. Here GLC,Σ is the collection of all T ⊗ B(S)-measurable functions g : T ×
S → R for which g(t,.) is linear and continuous on S (i.e. belongs to S∗) for every t ∈ T and
for which there is an integrable function φg in L1
R(T,T ,µ) with sups∈St |g(t,s)| 6 φg(t) for
all t ∈ T. The feeble topology can simultaneously subsume the two customary topologies
that have been used in the literature on games with a measure space of players (we refer to
Balder [4, 7] to precisions and examples). Following Balder [7, Remark 4.3.1] the space SΣ
is compact, the feeble topology on SΣ is semimetrizable and if a sequence (fn) converges
feebly to f in SΣ, then
(2.1) f(t) ∈ co
\
p∈N
cl{fn(t) : n > p}, a.e.t ∈ T.
Let us now deﬁne as the externality of each player t ∈ T the mapping d := (¯ d, ˆ d) : SΣ →
SΣ × Rm, which is deﬁned by







Here f|T ∈ SΣ stands for the restriction to T of f ∈ SΣ. Also, for each i ∈ {1,...,m},
gi : D ∩ (b T × S) → R is a given function that satisﬁes the following condition.
Assumption 2.3. For each i ∈ {1,...,m}, gi belongs to b GC,Σ.
Here b GC,Σ is the collection of all b T ⊗B(S)-measurable functions g : b T ×S → R for which
g(t,.) is continuous on S for every t ∈ b T and for which there is an integrable function φg
in L1
R(b T, b T ,µ) with sups∈St |g(t,s)| 6 φg(t) for all t ∈ b T. The externality d(f) depends on
the action f(t) of each player t in T and depends only on the aggregate ˆ d(f) over all b T.
Each player t ∈ T must choose her actions in accordance with the other players as
follows: given the action proﬁle f ∈ SΣ, player t’s socially feasible actions constitute a
given subset At(d(f)) ⊂ St.4 V.F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND M. TOPUZU
Until now our model follows almost verbatim the model presented in Balder [4, 7].
Further, we consider a more general framework to model the preference of each player.
Every player t ∈ T has a preferred to multifunction
Pt : St × SΣ × Rm → 2St.
Given the action proﬁle ¯ f ∈ SΣ, the externality vector y ∈ Rm and an action s ∈ St, the
set Pt(s, ¯ f,y) represents the set of actions s0 ∈ St that agent t strictly prefers to action s.
Example 2.1. In Balder [4, 7], each agent t is endowed with a payoﬀ function Ut :
St × SΣ × Rm → [−∞,+∞]. In that case, Pt is deﬁned by
Pt(s, ¯ f,y) := {s0 ∈ St : Ut(s0, ¯ f,y) > Ut(s, ¯ f,y)}.
Remark 2.1. Observe that given an agent t ∈ T, the preferred to multifunction Pt is
deﬁned on St×SΣ×Rm. In the literature (see Balder–Yannelis [8], Khan–Papageorgiou [14,
13], Khan–Vohra [15], Kim–Prikry–Yannelis [16], Noguchi [19, 20] and Yannelis [25, 26]),
the preferred to multifunction is deﬁned only on SΣ × Rm. Moreover it is claimed in
Balder [6] that for a game with payoﬀ functions Ut : St × SΣ × Rm → [−∞,+∞], the
canonical preferred to multifunction for an agent t ∈ T is deﬁned by
Pt( ¯ f,y) := {s ∈ St : Ut(s, ¯ f,y) > Ut( ¯ f(t), ¯ f,y)}.
We claim that this modeling of preferences is not relevant. First because it is proved in
Balder [6] that the usual conditions used in the literature for this model force the preferred
to multifunctions to be empty valued almost everywhere in the nonatomic part of the
measure space of agents. Second because this model does not encompass the literature
dealing with games or abstract economies with a measure space of agents but without
externalities: in Schmeidler [22], Cornet–Topuzu–Yildiz [10] and Martins-da-Rocha [17, 18]
the preferred to multifunction Pt is deﬁned on St, hence a natural modeling of preferences to
deal with externalities is to consider a preferred to multifunction Pt deﬁned on St×SΣ×Rm.
We refer to Balder [7, Section 2.4] for a discussion about the consistency question regarding
to our modeling of preferences.
Deﬁnition 2.1. For each t ∈ T, ¯ f ∈ SΣ and y ∈ Rm, we denote by Mt( ¯ f,y) the set of
optimal actions in the socially feasible set At( ¯ f,y), i.e.
Mt( ¯ f,y) = {s ∈ At( ¯ f,y) : Pt(s, ¯ f,y) ∩ At( ¯ f,y) = ∅}.
Example 2.2. If agent t is endowed with a payoﬀ function Ut : St×SΣ×Rm → [−∞,+∞],
then Mt( ¯ f,y) coincides with
argmaxs∈At( ¯ f,y)Ut(s, ¯ f,y) := {s ∈ St : Ut(s, ¯ f,y) = sup{Ut(s0, ¯ f,y) : s0 ∈ At( ¯ f,y)}}.
We present hereafter the list of assumptions the optimal actions multifunction will be
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Assumption 2.4 (convexity). For each player t ∈ T, the multifunction Mt has convex
values, i.e. for each ( ¯ f,y) ∈ SΣ × Rm, the set Mt( ¯ f,y) is convex.
Assumption 2.5 (continuity). For each player t ∈ T, the multifunction ( ¯ f,y) 7→ Mt( ¯ f,y)
is upper-semicontinuous with non-empty values.
Assumption 2.6 (measurability). For every ( ¯ f,y) ∈ SΣ × Rm, the multifunction t 7→
Mt( ¯ f,y) has a measurable graph.
Remark 2.2. Assumption 2.4 is satisﬁed if for every player t ∈ T, for every ( ¯ f,y) ∈
SΣ × Rm the set At( ¯ f,y) and for every action s ∈ St, the set {s0 ∈ St : s 6∈ Pt(s0, ¯ f,y)}
are convex. In particular, if the preferred to multifunction is deﬁned by a payoﬀ function
Ut : St × SΣ × Rm → [−∞,+∞] then the last property is satisﬁed if s 7→ Ut(s, ¯ f,y) is
quasi-concave.
We provide in Section 3 conditions on the primitives A and P of a game such that
Assumptions 2.5 and 2.6 are satisﬁed.
Theorem 2.1. Under Assumptions 2.1 to 2.6, the game Γ := (T,Σ,A,P) has a pure
Cournot–Nash equilibrium, that is, there exists an action proﬁle f∗ ∈ SΣ such that for
almost every player t ∈ T,
f∗(t) ∈ At(d(f∗)) and Pt(f∗(t),d(f∗)) ∩ At(d(f∗)) = ∅.
Remark 2.3. We propose in Section 4 two approaches to prove Theorem 2.1. In Sec-
tion 4.1, we consider a game Γ satisfying Assumptions 2.1 to 2.6. We deﬁne an auxiliary
game Γ0 with payoﬀ functions such that optimal action proﬁles for Γ0 and optimal action
proﬁles for Γ coincide. We check that the auxiliary game Γ0 satisﬁes the set of assumptions
needed to apply Theorem 2.2.1 in Balder [7]. We then get the existence of a Cournot–Nash
equilibrium for Γ0 which is also a Cournot–Nash equilibrium for the initial game Γ. Fol-
lowing this approach, our existence for non-ordered preferences appears to be a corollary
of the existence results for ordered preferences in Balder [4, 7].
In Section 4.1 we propose a proof purely by means of the feeble topology which is an
independent proof of Theorem 2.2.1 in Balder [7]. It was already announced in Balder [4,
Section 5] and Balder [7, Remark 4.3.1] that such a proof was possible for ordered pref-
erences. However the proof we propose deals not only with ordered preferences but also
with non-ordered preferences.
Remark 2.4. Following the arguments in Balder [7, Section 4.3] we may prove, as a
corollary of our pure Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence result (Theorem 2.1), a gen-
eralization to non-ordered preferences of the mixed Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence
result by Balder [7, Theorem 2.1].6 V.F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND M. TOPUZU
3. Assumptions on primitives
Let Γ = (T,Σ,A,P) be a game. We provide in this section conditions on the primitives
A and P of the game such that Assumptions 2.5 and 2.6 are satisﬁed. We ﬁrst consider a
list of assumptions on the multifunction A of socially feasible actions.
Assumption 3.1. For every (t, ¯ f,y) ∈ T × SΣ × Rm,
(i) the set At( ¯ f,y) is a non-empty and closed subset of St;
(ii) the multifunction At : SΣ × Rm → 2St is upper-semicontinuous;
(iii) the graph of the multifunction t 7→ At( ¯ f,y) belongs to T ⊗ B(S).
Remark 3.1. Assumption 3.1 coincides with Assumption 2.2.5 in Balder [7].
We consider now a list of assumptions on the preferred to multifunction P.
Assumption 3.2. For every (t, ¯ f,y) ∈ T × SΣ × Rm,
(i) for every s ∈ St, s 6∈ Pt(s, ¯ f,y) and one of the two following conditions is satisﬁed:
a. the multifunction s 7→ Pt(s, ¯ f,y) is transitive1
b. At( ¯ f,y) is convex and s 6∈ coPt(s, ¯ f,y) for each s ∈ St;
(ii) the multifunction s 7→ Pt(s, ¯ f,y) has open lower-sections;
(iii) the set {(s, ¯ f,y) ∈ St × SΣ × Rm : Pt(s, ¯ f,y) ∩ At( ¯ f,y) 6= ∅} is open;
(iv) the graph of the multifunction (t,s) 7→ Pt(s, ¯ f,y) belongs to T ⊗ B(S) ⊗ B(S).
Remark 3.2. Following Proposition A.1 in Appendix A, Condition (iii) in Assumption 3.2
may be replaced by one of the three following conditions:
(iii.1) the multifunction Pt has open lower-sections and open upper-sections, and At( ¯ f,y)
is the closure of Bt( ¯ f,y) where Bt : SΣ × Rm → 2St has open lower-sections;
(iii.2) the graph of the multifunction Pt : St × SΣ × Rm → 2St is open and the multi-
function At is lower-semicontinuous;
(iii.3) the multifunction Pt is lower-semicontinuous and At( ¯ f,y) = St.
Corollary 3.1. Let Γ = (T,Σ,A,P) be a game satisfying Assumptions 2.1 to 2.4, 3.1 and
3.2. Then the game Γ has a pure Cournot–Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We can check that under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 im-
ply Assumptions 2.5 and 2.6. Indeed, Assumption 3.1(iii) and Assumption 3.2(iv) imply
Assumption 2.6. Assumption 3.1(i) and Assumption 3.2(i-ii) imply that for each ( ¯ f,y)
the set Mt( ¯ f,y) is non-empty. Assumption 3.1(ii) and Assumption 3.2(iii) imply that the
multifunction Mt is upper-semicontinuous. 
We provide now a corollary of Corollary 3.1 for games with payoﬀ functions.





0 ∈ Pt(s, ¯ f,y) and s
00 ∈
Pt(s
0, ¯ f,y)] implies s
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Assumption 3.3. For each t ∈ T, agent t is endowed with a payoﬀ function Ut : St ×
SΣ × Rm → [−∞,+∞] such that for every (t, ¯ f,y) ∈ T × SΣ × Rm,
(i) the function Ut is upper-semicontinuous;
(ii) the function (t,s) 7→ Ut(s, ¯ f,y) is D-measurable;
(iii) the function ( ¯ f,y) 7→ sups∈At( ¯ f,y) Ut(s, ¯ f,y) is lower-semicontinuous on SΣ ×Rm.
Corollary 3.2. Let Γ = (T,Σ,A,P) be a game satisfying Assumptions 2.1–2.4, 3.1
and 3.3. Then the game Γ has a pure Cournot–Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We can check that under Assumptions 2.1–2.4 and Assumption 3.1, Assumption 3.3
implies Assumption 3.2. Indeed since the preferred to multifunctions are deﬁned by pay-
oﬀ functions, Assumption 3.2(i) is automatically satisﬁed. Assumption 3.2(ii) follows
from Assumption 3.3(i), Assumption 3.2(iv) follows from Assumption 3.3(ii), and As-
sumption 3.2(iii) follows from Assumptions 3.3(i,iii). 
Remark 3.3. Corollary 3.2 coincides with Theorem 2.2.1 in Balder [7]. In particular,
Corollary 3.1 generalizes Theorem 2.1 in Balder [4] and Theorem 2.2.1 in Balder [7] to
games with possibly non-ordered preferences.
Remark 3.4. In Corollary 3.2, if we replace condition (i) by the following condition
(i’) the function Ut is continuous;
then under Assumption 3.1, condition (iii) of Assumption 3.3 is automatically satisﬁed.
4. Proof of Theorem 2.1
Let Γ := (T,Σ,A,P) be a game satisfying Assumptions 2.1 to 2.4. Since S is Suslin
there exists a metric d on S which is weaker than the original topology. Hence on compact
subsets of S the original topology and the d-topology coincide. Observe that each Borel σ-
algebra corresponding to the d-topology coincides with B(S), because S is Suslin (Corollary
2 of Theorem II.10 of Schwartz [23]).
4.1. Indirect proof. For each player t ∈ T, consider the payoﬀ function Vt : St × SΣ ×
Rm → [−∞,+∞], deﬁned by
∀(s, ¯ f,y) ∈ St × SΣ × Rm, Vt(s, ¯ f,y) := −d(s,Mt( ¯ f,y)).2
We consider now the game Γ0 := (T,Σ,A0,P0) which is truly noncooperative, i.e. for each
( ¯ f,y) ∈ SΣ × Rm, A0
t( ¯ f,y) = St. The preferred to multifunction is deﬁned by the payoﬀ
function V , i.e.
P0
t(s, ¯ f,y) := {s0 ∈ St : Vt(s0, ¯ f,y) > Vt(s, ¯ f,y)}.
Claim 4.1. For every t ∈ T, the function Vt is upper-semicontinuous.
2If A is a subset of S and s ∈ S then d(s,A) := inf{d(s,a) : a ∈ A}.8 V.F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND M. TOPUZU
Proof. Let t ∈ T and c ∈ R, we have to prove that
L := {(s, ¯ f,y) ∈ St × SΣ × Rm : d(s,Mt( ¯ f,y)) 6 c}
is closed. Let (sn, ¯ fn,yn) be a sequence in L which converges to (s, ¯ f,y) ∈ St × SΣ × Rm.
For each n > 0, there exists ˜ sn in Mt( ¯ fn,yn) such that d(sn, ˜ sn) 6 c + 1/n. Since St is
compact, passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can suppose that (˜ sn) is convergent to
˜ s in St. From Assumption 2.5, ˜ s belongs to Mt( ¯ f,y), hence
d(s,Mt( ¯ f,y)) 6 d(s, ˜ s) = lim nd(sn, ˜ sn) 6 c.

Claim 4.2. For each ( ¯ f,y) ∈ SΣ × Rm, the multifunction (t,s) 7→ Vt(s, ¯ f,y) deﬁned on
D is D-measurable.
Proof. Let ( ¯ f,y) ∈ SΣ × Rm, we let F : T → 2S be the multifunction deﬁned by F(t) :=
Mt( ¯ f,y). From Assumption 2.6 the multifunction F has a measurable graph. From
Castaing–Valadier [9, Theorem III.22] (see also Sainte Beuve [21]), there exists a sequence
(σn) of measurable functions σn : T → S such that (σn(t)) is dense in F(t) for every t ∈ T.
It follows that for each s ∈ S,
d(s,F(t)) = inf{d(s,σn(t)) : n ∈ N}.
Hence for each s ∈ S the function t 7→ d(s,F(t)) is measurable, and for each t ∈ T, the
function s 7→ d(s,F(t)) is continuous. Applying Lemma III.14 in Castaing–Valadier [9],
we get that (t,s) 7→ d(s,F(t)) is T ⊗ B(S)-measurable. Since F(t) is a subset of St, it
follows that (t,s) 7→ d(s,F(t)) is D-measurable. 
Claim 4.3. For every t ∈ T, for every ( ¯ f,y) ∈ SΣ × Rm,
argmaxs∈StVt(s, ¯ f,y) = Mt( ¯ f,y).
Proof. Let t ∈ T and ( ¯ f,y) ∈ SΣ × Rm. From Assumption 2.5, the set Mt( ¯ f,y) is non-
empty, hence there exists σ ∈ St such that Vt(σ, ¯ f,y) = 0. Now since Vt(s, ¯ f,y) 6 0 for
each s ∈ St, we have that
argmaxs∈StVt(s, ¯ f,y) = {s ∈ St : d(s,Mt( ¯ f,y)) = 0}.
From Assumption 2.5, Mt( ¯ f,y) is closed, hence the claim follows. 
We claim that the game Γ0 satisﬁes Assumptions 2.2.5 to 2.2.7 in Balder [7]. Indeed,
the game Γ0 is truly noncooperative, in the sense that for each ( ¯ f,y) ∈ SΣ×Rm, for every
t ∈ T, A0
t( ¯ f,y) = St. Hence Assumption 2.2.5 in [7] is trivially satisﬁed. From Claims 4.1
and 4.2, Assumption 2.2.6 in [7] is satisﬁed. Observe that for every t ∈ T, the function
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is identical to zero, so Assumption 2.2.7.(i) in [7] is trivially satisﬁed. Assumption 2.2.7.(ii)
in [7] follows from Claim 4.3 and Assumption 2.4.
Now we can apply Theorem 2.2.1 in Balder [7] to get the existence of a Cournot–Nash
equilibrium f∗ for the game Γ0. Obviously f∗ is also a Cournot–Nash equilibrium for the
game Γ.
4.2. Direct proof. For each ( ¯ f,y) ∈ SΣ×Rm we let SM( ¯ f,y) denote the set of all functions
¯ g ∈ SΣ such that ¯ g(t) ∈ Mt( ¯ f,y) for a.e. t ∈ T.
Claim 4.4. The multifunction ( ¯ f,y) 7−→ SM( ¯ f,y) is upper-semicontinuous with compact
convex and non-empty values.
Let Y be the subset of Rm deﬁned by
Y :=







where b SΣ is the set of all restrictions to b T of functions in SΣ.
Claim 4.5. The set Y is compact convex and non-empty.
For each ( ¯ f,y) ∈ SΣ × Rm let Y( ¯ f,y) be the subset of Y deﬁned by
Y( ¯ f,y) :=







where b SM( ¯ f,y) is the set of all functions ˆ g ∈ b SΣ such that ˆ g(t) ∈ Mt( ¯ f,y) for a.e. t ∈ b T.
Claim 4.6. The multifunction ( ¯ f,y) 7−→ Y( ¯ f,y) is upper-semicontinuous with compact
convex and non-empty values.
Following Claims 4.4–4.6, the multifunction
( ¯ f,y) 7−→ SM( ¯ f,y) × Y( ¯ f,y)
deﬁned on the non-empty compact convex SΣ × Y is upper-semicontinuous with non-
empty compact convex values. Applying a non-Hausdorﬀ version of Kakutani’s ﬁxed-point
theorem (see Balder [4, Theorem A.2]), there exists ( ¯ f∗,y∗) ∈ SΣ × Y such that
(4.1) ¯ f∗ ∈ SM( ¯ f∗,y∗) and y∗ ∈ Y( ¯ f∗,y∗).





ˆ f∗(t) if t ∈ b T
¯ f∗(t) if t ∈ T.
The function f∗ belongs to SΣ and ( ¯ f∗,y∗) = d(f∗). Following (4.1), f∗(t) ∈ Mt(d(f∗)) for
a.e. t ∈ T, i.e. f∗ is a Cournot–Nash equilibrium of Γ.10 V.F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND M. TOPUZU
Appendix A. Continuous multifunctions
Let X and Y two semimetrizable topological vector spaces and F a multifunction from
X to Y .
Deﬁnition A.1. The multifunction F is said: to be upper-semicontinuous if for each
open set V ⊂ Y the set {x ∈ X: F(x) ⊂ V } is open; to have a closed graph if the set
{(x,y) ∈ X × Y : y ∈ F(x)} is closed.
We recall the following well-known equivalence result (see e.g. Florenzano [11, Appen-
dix A]). If there exists a compact set K ⊂ Y such that for each x ∈ X, F(x) ⊂ K then
the multifunction F is upper-semicontinuous if and only if it has a closed graph.
Deﬁnition A.2. The multifunction F is said: to have an open graph if {(x,y) ∈ X ×
Y : y ∈ F(x)} is open; to have open lower-sections if for each y ∈ Y , the set {x ∈
X: F(x) 3 y} is open; to have open upper-sections if for each x ∈ Y , the set F(x) is
open; and to be lower-semicontinuous if for each non-empty open set V ⊂ Y the set
{x ∈ X: F(x) ∩ V 6= ∅} is open.
Proposition A.1. Let S and ∆ be Hausdorﬀ topological spaces and consider a multifunc-
tion P from S × ∆ to S and A from ∆ to S. Consider the following conditions:
(iii.1) the multifunction P has open lower-sections and open upper-sections and for each
δ ∈ ∆, A(δ) is the closure of B(δ) where the multifunction B : ∆ → S has open
lower-sections;
(iii.2) the graph of the multifunction P : S × ∆ → S is open and the multifunction A is
lower-semicontinuous;
(iii.3) the multifunction P is lower-semicontinuous and A(δ) = S for each δ ∈ ∆.
Then each one of the above conditions imply the following one:
(iii) the set {(s,δ) ∈ S × ∆ : P(s,δ) ∩ A(δ) 6= ∅} is open.
Proof of: (iii1) implies (iii). For each (s,δ) ∈ S×∆, P(s,δ) is open hence P(s,δ)∩A(δ) 6=
∅ if and only if P(s,δ) ∩ B(δ) 6= ∅. Let (s,δ) ∈ S × ∆ such that P(s,δ) ∩ B(δ) 6= ∅ and
let σ ∈ S be such that σ ∈ P(s,δ) ∩ B(δ). Since P has open lower-sections there exist
open sets U and V in S and ∆ such that (s,δ) ∈ U × V and for each (s0,δ0) ∈ U × V ,
P(s0,δ0) 3 σ. Since B has open lower-sections there exists an open set W in ∆ such that
δ ∈ W and for each δ0 ∈ W, B(δ0) 3 σ. It then follows that (s,δ) ∈ U × (V ∩ W) and for
each (s0,δ0) ∈ U × (V ∩ W), P(s0,δ0) ∩ B(δ0) 6= ∅. 
Proof of: (iii2) implies (iii). Let (s,δ) ∈ S × ∆ such that P(s,δ) ∩ A(δ) 6= ∅. Let σ ∈ S
be such that σ ∈ P(s,δ) ∩ A(δ). Since P has an open graph, there exists two open
sets U, V in S and an open set W in ∆ such that (s,δ,σ) ∈ U × W × V and for each
(s0,δ0,σ0) ∈ U×W×V , P(s0,δ0)∩A(δ0) 3 σ0. The multifunction A is lower semi-continuous
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in ∆ such that δ ∈ W0 and for each δ0 ∈ W0, A(δ0) ∩ V 6= ∅. It then follows that
(s,δ) ∈ U × (W ∩ W0) and for each (s0,δ0) ∈ U × (W ∩ W0), P(s0,δ0) ∩ A(δ0) 6= ∅. 
Proof of: (iii3) implies (iii). For each (s,δ) ∈ S × ∆, P(s,δ) ∩ A(δ) 6= ∅ if and only if
P(s,δ) ∩ S 6= ∅. The set S is open, hence (iii) follows from the lower semi-continuity of
the multifunction P. 
Appendix B. Proof of Claim 4.4
We ﬁrst prove that for each ( ¯ f,y), the set SM( ¯ f,y) is non-empty and convex. Fix ( ¯ f,y),
from Assumption 2.6 the multifunction t 7→ Mt( ¯ f,y) has a measurable graph. By applying
the von Neumann–Aumann measurable selection theorem (Theorem III.22 of Castaing–
Valadier [9]) there exists a measurable selection of t 7→ Mt( ¯ f,y). This implies that the set
SM( ¯ f,y) is non-empty. The convexity follows from Assumption 2.4.
We now prove that the multifunction ( ¯ f,y) 7→ SM( ¯ f,y) is upper-semicontinuous. For
each ( ¯ f,y), the set SM( ¯ f,y) is a subset of the compact set SΣ. Hence to prove the upper-
semicontinuity, we consider a sequence ( ¯ fn,yn, ¯ gn) in SΣ×Rm×SΣ converging to ( ¯ f,y, ¯ g)
in SΣ × Rm × SΣ such that
∀n ∈ N, ¯ gn ∈ SM( ¯ fn,yn).
We have to prove that ¯ g belongs to SM( ¯ f,y). From (2.1)
¯ g(t) ∈ co
\
p∈N
cl{fn(t) : n > p} a.e.t ∈ T.
From Assumption 2.5 the multifunction Mt(.,.) is upper-semicontinuous and then
\
p∈N
cl{fn(t) : n > p} ⊂ Mt( ¯ f,y) a.e.t ∈ T.
From Assumptions 2.4 and 2.5, the set Mt( ¯ f,y) is closed convex, thus
¯ g(t) ∈ co
\
p∈N
cl{fn(t) : n > p} ⊂ Mt( ¯ f,y) a.e.t ∈ T.
Appendix C. Proof of Claim 4.5
We ﬁrst prove that the set Y is non-empty and convex. From Assumption 2.2 the
multifunction t 7→ St has a measurable graph. By applying the von Neumann–Aumann
measurable selection theorem (Theorem III.22 of Castaing–Valadier [9]) there exists a
measurable selection of t 7→ St. This implies that the set b SΣ is non-empty and thus Y is
non-empty. The convexity follows from the Extended Lyapunov Theorem in Balder [2].12 V.F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND M. TOPUZU
We now prove that Y is a compact set. From Assumption 2.3, the set Y is bounded.
Consider now a sequence (yn) in Y converging to y ∈ Rm. There exists a sequence ( ˆ fn)
in b SΣ such that





For each n ∈ N, denote by ϕn(t) the vector (gj(t, ˆ fn(t))) in Rm. From the multivalued




ϕ(t)µ(dt) and ϕ(t) ∈ co
\
p∈N
cl{ϕn(t) : n > p} a.e.t ∈ b T.
For each t ∈ b T, the set St is compact and the mapping gj(t,.) is continuous. It then
follows that for almost every t ∈ b T there exists st ∈ St such that ϕj(t) = gj(t,st) for every
j ∈ {1,...,m}. Let Σϕ : b T → S be the multifunction deﬁned by
∀t ∈ b T, Σϕ(t) = {s ∈ Σ(t) : gj(t,s) = ϕj(t) ∀j ∈ {1,...,m}}.
The multifunction Σϕ has a measurable graph with non-empty values. By applying
the von Neumann–Aumann measurable selection theorem (Theorem III.22 of Castaing–




gj(t, ˆ f(t))µ(dt) ∀j ∈ {1,...,m},
which yields that y ∈ Y .
Appendix D. Proof of Claim 4.6
We ﬁrst prove that for each ( ¯ f,y), the set Y( ¯ f,y) is non-empty and convex. Fix ( ¯ f,y),
from Assumption 2.6 the multifunction t 7→ Mt( ¯ f,y) has a measurable graph. By applying
the von Neumann–Aumann measurable selection theorem (Theorem III.22 of Castaing–
Valadier [9]) there exists a measurable selection of t 7→ Mt( ¯ f,y). This implies that the
set b SM( ¯ f,y) is non-empty. The convexity follows from the Extended Lyapunov Theorem in
Balder [2].
We now prove that the multifunction ( ¯ f,y) 7→ Y( ¯ f,y) is upper-semicontinuous. For
each ( ¯ f,y), the set Y( ¯ f,y) is a subset of the compact set Y . Hence to prove the upper-
semicontinuity, we consider a sequence ( ¯ fn,yn,zn) in SΣ ×Rm ×Y converging to ( ¯ f,y,z)
in SΣ × Rm × Y such that
∀n ∈ N, zn ∈ Y( ¯ fn,yn).
We have to prove that z belongs to Y( ¯ f,y). There exists a sequence (ˆ hn) in b SM( ¯ fn,yn) such
that
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For each n ∈ N, denote by ϕn(t) the vector (gj(t,ˆ hn(t))) in Rm. From the multivalued




ϕ(t)µ(dt) and ϕ(t) ∈ co
\
p∈N
cl{ϕn(t) : n > p} a.e.t ∈ b T.
For each t ∈ b T, the multifunction Mt(.,.) is upper-semicontinuous and the mapping gj(t,.)
is continuous. It then follows that for almost every t ∈ b T there exists st ∈ Mt( ¯ f,y) such
that ϕj(t) = gj(t,st) for every j ∈ {1,...,m}. Let ΣM : b T → S be the multifunction
deﬁned by
∀t ∈ b T, ΣM(t) = {s ∈ Mt( ¯ f,y) : gj(t,s) = ϕj(t) ∀j ∈ {1,...,m}}.
From Assumption 2.6 the multifunction ΣM has a measurable graph with non-empty
values. By applying the von Neumann–Aumann measurable selection theorem (Theorem




hj(t, ˆ f(t))µ(dt) ∀j ∈ {1,...,m},
which yields that z ∈ Y( ¯ f,y).
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